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The translator and poet Sarah Ruden published her new and in some 
ways quite original translation of Augustine’s Confessions in 2017. 
In a fighting introductory essay she explains her position which she 
characterises as maverick. She contrasts her own work against other 
translations, which she regards as more traditional. Ruden makes 
provocative claims about the allegedly conventional interpretations, 
which, relative to hers she argues, can work to obscure rather than 
convey what the Bishop of Hippo intended his contemporary 
audience to understand. This essay forms a reflection on her claims 
and sets some of her passages against the original Latin and those of 
other modern English translators. While Ruden’s is a welcome 
contribution to a well populated field of translations into modern 
languages, her claims and strategies are not found to be always 
entirely judicious. 
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1.  Sine praedicante 
At Confessions 1.1 Augustine is rhetorically asking God, to whom his work is 
addressed, how he ought best to begin: 
da mihi domine, scire et intellegere, utrum sit prius invocare te an laudare 
te. sed quis te invocat nesciens te? aliud enim pro alio potest invocare 
nesciens. an potius invocaris ut sciaris? quomodo autem invocabunt, in 
quem non crediderunt? aut quomodo credent sine praedicante? 
Sarah Ruden’s new translation is a self-consciously updating one, it breaks with 
conventions in several ways and aims to redeem Augustine as ‘literary artist’, the 
‘poetic creator’ (p. xxviii) and in its way efface ‘any impression of Augustine — in 
this work, anyway — as a plodder or systematizer rather than a poetic, organically 
branching, rather whimsical author’ (p. xl). There is a long tradition of reading and 
translating Augustine, devoted scholars and readers have reflected on his works for 
many centuries. To give a sample of how many English readers, since the 17th 
century, would first have encountered this opening passage, here are the above 
lines rendered by William Watts from his translation first published in 1631,  
(he had relied in some measure on Sir Tobie Matthew’s 1624 translation, even 
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while referring to Matthews as ‘the papist’ — readings of Augustine have long 
been contentious):1 
Grant me, Lord, to know and understand what I ought first to do, whether 
call upon thee, or praise thee? and which ought to be first, to know thee, or 
to call upon thee? But who can rightly call upon thee that is yet ignorant of 
thee? for such an one may instead of thee call upon another. Or art thou first 
called upon that thou mayest so come to be known? But how then shall they 
call on him, in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe 
without a preacher [sine praedicante]? 
When it comes to works from Antiquity, the reader without Latin or Greek has to 
take a translator’s word for it, but fortunately there are many translations to  
choose from and weigh against one another these days. Perhaps, the most 
important way in which a translator can serve this particular writer is to emulate in 
some way his gift for expressing the tension, the inward drama, which was the very 
contents of his life as he regarded it.2 Augustine’s Confessions is a work 
memorably marked by such tensions and hesitations and a deep sensitivity to the 
reality of ignorance, of the self as a shadowy thing only partially illuminated by 
sacred truths that came from God and the hard-won insights of self-scrutiny.  
The heart is afflicted by lifelong disquiet, until it finds rest in God, inquietum est 
cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. In Confessions, these tensions and anxieties are 
vividly dramatized in the form of an extended apostrophe, by a man who defines 
himself through his formative doubts, questioning, his active and continuous 
intellectual and spiritual struggling. 
These struggles constitute the voyage towards his God’s grace, the 
movement towards salvation. His is a lifelong dialogue of inquiry and inter-
pretation of himself, as if he constituted a living text undergoing a delicate, 
ongoing exegesis, whose chapters’ meanings are illuminated by earlier chapters. 
This self — Augustine — is an unfolding story, acts and responses that form a 
Life, whose illuminations have been foreshadowed in its earlier instantiations, 
rather as Sacred Scripture is an account of new truths foreshadowed in revelations 
and narrations past. 
This tension — between past and present, understanding and ignorance, 
spiritual yearning and actual condition of hesitation and incomprehension — is in 
                                                   
1  See Rouse’s introduction to the Loeb edition of Watts’ translation, 1912. 
2  Cf. Brown 2000 [1967]:172-3: ‘It was a traditional theme to expose one’s soul to the 
commands of God, knowing He “searched the hearts of men”. But it was most unusual 
to insist, as Augustine does, that no man could ever sufficiently search his own heart, 
that the “spreading, limitless room” was so complex, so mysterious, that no one could 
ever know his whole personality; ...’.  
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part the greatness of the work and the man. Its complexity and liveliness issue from 
the strongly felt sense of difficulty and a deeply intimate life of thought cogently 
conveyed but finely retaining every subtlety of colouring. Many readers have 
experienced this simultaneous power and nuance of the work, which has the 
immediacy of a living internal voice, the volume and presence of consciousness 
itself.  
No sense of doubt, tension or hesitation, by contrast, is expressed by the 
intrepid translator Sarah Ruden in the introduction to her bold, new translation.  
It is, rather, with a surprising sureness of step that she sets about the notoriously 
complex task of offering another translation, among many, of this fresh 1600-year-
old voice. She suggests that, finally, it has found the translator — in her 
impartiality, freedom from political correctness and unencumberance by 
theological prejudice and tiresome scholarly practice3 — it finally deserves. 
It is a view of her work apparently shared by none other than J M Coetzee. 
It is worth citing the recommendation to which he lends his distinguished name 
because it raises very great expectations in the reader and potential buyer of this 
version and to the scholar interested in Augustine it is an enticement that cannot be 
ignored. Coetzee’s ‘advance praise for Sarah Ruden’s translation’ runs: 
Based on fresh insights into what it meant in Augustine’s day to write good 
prose, Sarah Ruden has produced a version of Confessions that speaks to us 
clearly and directly and may well reflect Augustine’s meaning more 
accurately than any other translation hitherto. 
The prospect of ‘fresh insights’ into such an enduringly powerful work, by the 
most influential African writer in history is always going to excite. ‘What it meant 
to write good prose’ in Late Antiquity is of course a fascinating topic in itself and it 
is true that Ruden’s work speaks mostly clearly and very directly. In fact, both the 
chief merit and most questionable characteristic of Ruden’s Confessions is the 
vividness, after which above all she seems to have been striving. Coetzee simply 
goes too far, however, with the injudicious (‘may well’ notwithstanding) ‘reflect 
Augustine’s meaning more accurately than any other translation hitherto’. The 20th 
and 21st century reader has been living in a golden age of scholarship and the 
number of biographies, histories of the period and translations of Augustine into 
                                                   
3  For example, ‘I fill in a lot of blanks, believing it to be very tiresome behaviour to send 
readers to footnote after footnote just so that I can try to simulate a degree of cursoriness 
[she means Augustine’s tendency to refer to persons or groups with pronouns rather than 
repeating their names] that can’t exist in formal English writing except under the 
headings “careless” and “bad”. Any representation of Augustine that gives that 
impression is not authentic’. (pp. xxxviii-ix). 
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English, not to mention the other modern languages, leaves us truly spoiled for 
choice. If this is a competition, it is stiff. 
For those with Latin or who wish for detailed commentary, there is the 
recent but already authoritative text edited by J J O’Donnell with learned and 
highly regarded notes, (Oxford, 1992, freely available online). As for translation 
into English, in the last quarter-century alone, we can look to Chadwick for OUP 
(1991), the widely admired version of Boulding (Hodder & Stoughton, 1997), 
Wills’ Penguin translation (2004), Hammond’s bilingual Loeb (2016, a 
replacement of Watts’ version which, updated by Pusey in the 19th century, had 
served the Loeb Library up to 2016). Frank Sheed’s 1942 translation has been 
greatly respected and it is the one through which many English speakers will first 
have come to know Augustine. It possibly retains for that reason a special place in 
their relationship with the writer and his work, (it was my own father’s — born 
1923 — much loved translation). Sheed’s appeared in a second edition in 2006 
with an introduction by Peter Brown and notes and appendix by Michael Foley.4 
With its timelines and chapter headings, its maps, suggestions for further reading, 
concise opening essay, discreet footnotes and illuminating glossary of select terms 
(see for example the excellent note on ‘typological exegesis’ pp. 333-4), it is hard 
to imagine a piece of work more well judged and helpful to the receptive reader. 
Against all of these Ruden’s, it is a pity to report, suffers by comparison despite the 
special pleading to ‘professors who may be inclined to anathematize my translation 
because it is different’ in her introduction (p. xxvi). It is not that her translation is 
‘different’ that is problematic and no one should find her translation ‘anathema’ 
(note the light pre-empting of anything like ecclesiastical authority in the term). 
The problem is how it is different. 
It has been a golden age also for books about Augustine and the world of 
Late Antiquity: from John Burnaby’s Amor Dei (1938, ‘the greatest of intellectual 
biographies’, in Chadwick’s estimation); Pierre Courcelle’s watershed study of 
Confessions (1950, expanded 1968); to the great Peter Brown’s contributions to the 
field over a very distinguished career, most pertinently Augustine of Hippo — A 
biography (1967, and the new edition with epilogue discussion of new evidence, 
2000). The reader who came to Augustine through Ruden’s new Modern Library 
edition would never have an inkling. On Augustine scholarship we hear only, in 
the last line of her acknowledgements (p. 484), that she is ‘particularly indebted 
also to Robin Lane Fox for Augustine: Conversion to Confessions (2015)’.5  
                                                   
4  Sheed 2006.  
5  See the unfavourable review of this work by the Augustine translator and scholar Garry 
Wills in The New York Review of Books (January, 14 2016 issue) and the ensuing 
exchange of letters, New York Review of Books (March, 10 2016 issue). 
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Now, her mandate may have been to produce an ‘accessible’ translation, in 
updated English for this modern library of classics and to avoid encumbering the 
‘general reader’ — but there is no such thing — with the onera of professional 
scholarship. But Aurelius Augustine, probably ethnically Berber, a North African 
educated in the Latin lingua franca of the 4th century Roman Empire, a man who 
lived 1600 years ago: is this someone to whom one really wishes to pretend we can 
have absolutely direct access? If we believe we can meet him unimpeded, have we 
in some measure been taking in by the rhetorical power of his directly addressing 
first person voice? Imaginably, most readers of this will be educated, more or less 
critical, humanist, post-Enlightenment, post-industrial, late Moderns. We, perhaps, 
are just those ones who are ignorant — nesciens — of Augustine’s god and the 
nature of the relationship with that god evoked in the opening of Confessions. We 
must allow that we are just such as those who ‘have not believed’ — non 
crediderunt — of whom the writer wonders how they can begin to recognise what 
they have to do with here. How will we recognise this god, and how exactly will 
we — different kinds of person that we are — even recognise this man? What do 
we forfeit when we come to Augustine without a preacher — sine praedicante — 
without explanation, exegesis, interpretation? Too much I worry.  
New translations of important works ought always to be welcomed and we 
may be thankful to Ruden, for whatever the deficits of her work it is an 
accomplishment, which stimulates rich and fascinating questioning, an opportunity 
to revisit perennially important issues. One question that I have once again been 
asking myself in reflecting on this new version and her striking, somewhat 
polemical introductory essay, is what really translation is for and what its chief 
ambitions could or should be. Ruden explains her own motivations as follows  
(p. xxiii, my italics): 
My main justification for this new translation, after several learned and 
serviceable ones have become established, is the previously hidden degree 
to which Augustine makes his life and ideas vivid in the style of his Latin. 
(The fusion of form and content in ancient literature has become something 
of a specialty for me in the course of translating a variety of Latin, Greek, 
and now Hebrew works.) In Augustine, the manner of presentation is 
especially compelling, because of his stress on beauty and joy on the one 
hand, and intellectual helplessness on the other ... 
Translations are inherently failed enterprises. Jorge Luis Borges and Umberto Eco 
ingeniously drew the logical consequences of this inherent fallibility to their limits 
in their manner of 20th century Alexandrians, poetae docti. Ruden pleads 
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winsomely that if fail she must, she will ‘fail openly’.6 She concludes her opening 
remarks professing the hope that, at any rate, her work will provoke questions 
about translating, (‘if they only provoke debate and thereby bring more attention to 
the task of translating this astonishing author, I’ll count that as progress.’ p. xli). 
Translation is a field to which she has given no little thought and productively 
devoted herself, having now published a half a dozen translations from Greek and 
Latin and a work on the craft itself, The face of water: A translator on beauty and 
meaning in the Bible, 2017. 
There are many sensitive discussions about the nature and challenges of 
translating Augustine. Hammond is succinct and exemplary, the 2nd edition of 
Sheed carries its learning very lightly and will constitute no heavy burden to the 
non-specialist reader, quite the contrary. Part of the trouble in Ruden is that 
implicit in her introduction and in the product of her ideas about translation itself is 
a radical, artificial and deleterious — one may even say Manichaean — cleft 
between the scholarly and the popular; the archaic, the learned, the theologically 
searching and historically sensitive on one hand and the immediate, accessible (that 
unfortunate word again, is it the burden we bear for the gift of the internet?), 
colloquial and up-to-date, on the other. 
Ruden’s is what one may call an enthusiastic interpretation, a product  
of the secularism that itself originates from Martin Luther’s great revolution and  
its political and social consequences. One of the most very momentous acts in 
recent history was surely the act of translation by Luther and his fellow Protestants 
of the 16th century. Modern, Western, Democratic, Late Capitalist individualist, 
consumers feel free to study and examine and evaluate all the things of this world 
in their own language and they believe this language, the codes and values, which 
that language represents and conveys is sufficient to disclose the meanings of all 
historical experience and trans-historical truths. The demotic is valid. Look how 
successful it has been, see how the world and its people submit to the irrepressible 
logic and imperial sway of modernity. The American language — and this is really 
a translation into American — some may fancy, is supremely commensurate to the 
task of revealing things as they truly are and have been. So much is predicated, for 
modern people, on the sureness of unmediated accessibility to reality and truth, 
there is so much optimism and self-belief in the Lutheran impulse to publish in 
order to redeem truth from the preserve of elites and the learned, the jealous 
authority of the clerics. We are surely entitled to take things our way. It is just this 
                                                   
6  ‘Obviously, Augustine is the author here, and gets his way; I’m not his schoolmarm ...  
He gets his lofty “heaven of heavens” ... Splitting differences this way produces splitting 
headaches, and in the end even the best efforts may look rather comical. But I would 
rather fail openly, fall while going out on a limb for him, than leave him up there with 
no chance.’ (Ruden, p. xxx). 
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bracing, impressive, sometimes in truth stirringly refreshing kind of hermeneutic 
impudence, which constitutes the great failing and, one must admit, an uncertain, 
occasional appeal in Ruden’s translation. 
2.  Bereshit 
‘In the beginning ...’ (Genesis); ‘Wrath ...’ (Iliad); ‘Tell me of the man ...’ 
(Odyssey); ‘Arms and the man ...’ (Aeneid); ‘To tell of changed shapes, to new 
bodies my mind bears me ...’ (Metamorphoses) — the opening words and lines of 
an ancient text typically announce its themes, establish the posture of the speaker 
or author and serve as prefatory and titular to the larger work. Augustine himself 
devotes Books 11 and 12 of the thirteen Books of Confessions to a discussion of 
just the first two verses of the book of Genesis. The man who once reflected as he 
emerged from his study that ‘When a man hath done then he beginneth’, was quite 
careful of the significance of openings and their relation to closings. His opening 
questions ripple out over the surface of the work, lending it a searching 
momentum, that finds a response, as we shall see, in the very closing words of the 
last book. The opening is a good place, then, for a close examination of the 
translation of an ancient work, Conf. 1.1: 
Magnus es, domine, et laudabilis valde. magna virtus tua et sapientiae tuae 
non est numerus. et laudare te vult homo, aliqua portio creaturae tuae, et 
homo circumferens mortalitatem suam, circumferens testimonium peccati 
sui et testimonium quia superbis resistis; et tamen laudare te vult homo, 
aliqua portio creaturae tuae. tu excitas ut laudare te delectet, quia fecisti 
nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. 
Ruden’s rendering of this passage serves very well, as does Augustine’s proem to 
his larger work, as an example of her style and tone: 
You are mighty, Master, and to be praised with a powerful voice: great is 
your goodness, and of your wisdom there can be no reckoning. Yet to praise 
you is the desire of a human being, who is some part of what you created;  
a human hauling his deathliness in a circle, hauling in a circle the evidence 
of his sin, and the evidence that you stand against the arrogant. 
But still a mortal, a given portion of your creation, longs to extol you. In 
yourself you rouse us, giving us delight in glorifying you, because you 
made us with yourself as our goal, and our heart is restless until it rests in 
you. 
In her introduction Ruden offers a glossary of selected Latin words explaining their 
root meanings and the (‘non-standard’ p. xxxi) choices she has made for their 
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rendering into English, (offering such a glossary being fairly standard practice). 
Several of these glossed terms are in fact found in this passage. One of the very 
first words of Confessions is also one which Ruden has quite surprisingly broken 
with convention to translate anew. Dominus in Latin is typically given in English 
as ‘Lord’, familiar to hymn singers, prayers and light blasphemers everywhere, yet 
she, apparently unique amongst translators, renders it ‘master’. ‘Lord’ she explains 
‘suggests a ruler or nobleman, or another political authority, or the enthroned God 
of imagery starting in the Hebrew Bible’ (the Old Testament then), ‘The Latin 
Bible’s dominus, however, was far different in its contemporary associations’  
(p. xxxi). ‘Lord’ in English is to Ruden’s ear essentially political, while ‘master’ 
captures the Roman etymology of dominus derived from domus ‘household’, i.e. 
owner of a household and its contents, including slaves: ‘The unavoidable English 
translation seems to be “Master”’ (p. xxxi) — although, strictly speaking, that has 
been quite deftly avoided for generations. 
Two points here: on the nature of the English word ‘lord’ and its usage, and 
the accuracy of the claims about the restricted connotations for Augustine and his 
readers of the Latin dominus. The English ‘lord’ is not really be as restricted in its 
field of connotations as Ruden implies. One can after all be described as the ‘lord 
of one’s domain’, implying sovereignty over oneself one’s own destiny, a personal 
and even ethical dominion and not only one over public spaces or political orders. 
Terms like this are really unrestricted in their metaphorical elasticity. And yet, the 
allegedly unavoidable ‘master’, for all its rebarbative associations, is a translation, 
which if we are only honest we are compelled to accept, so Ruden (p. xxxiii): 
This imagery, with its reminders of American plantation slavery, may be 
harsh and off-putting, but a translator must govern her distaste and try to 
make her author’s thought and experience as vivid and sympathetic as it 
plainly was to his contemporaries. Otherwise, there can be no limits to the 
demands of a condescending, manipulative and anachronistic political 
correctness. 
Fighting talk and perhaps we should be more thankful to the dauntless translators 
who govern their distaste for our sake in the name of authenticity, vividness and 
sympathy. But one is, somehow, given pause. Is Augustine’s conception of God 
and his relationship to God really like that between slave-owners and slaves, or 
between the rogues and masters of Roman comedy (pp. xxxii-iii)? To be sure, the 
idea of an intertextual relationship with drama is intriguing, but not persuasively 
developed and besides the use of intertextual devices does not constitute 
submissive mimicry of earlier genres or forms, but dynamic and transformative 
acts of creativity and freedom. Augustine does not only passively deploy language 
but is one of the great transformers of meaning just as his account of conversion is 
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the narration of a transformation, a deepening and extending of the meaning of his 
own past and present life and consequently also of the language through which he 
lived and knew his own life. 
How, precisely, does the enforced servitude of American slaves bear 
resemblance to the willing service of Augustine — for Confessions is a study in the 
development of the will for — laudare te vult homo — the will towards god — 
quia fecisti nos ad te — enacting the disposition of yearning for god, the love 
which, by this mysterious recursiveness, is also god’s greatest gift to mortals. 
Confessions is occupied in a primary way with the motivations of the speaker, 
which he wishes to align at every level of himself with his God’s own desire for 
His creations: the servi dei are members of a community of love, amor dei, not 
indentured submissively or fatefully, but defined by their yearning, their freely 
willing, their active not passive relationship with a god marked by His love and not 
characterised by compulsion. 
There is a fundamental difference between servitude and service. The slave 
speaks ‘Master’, the servant willingly calls on his ‘Lord’ and volunteers himself  
in service, which is liberation from the chains of despotic, false masters: the flesh, 
specious teachings, nugatory entertainments. The distinction ‘lord’ and ‘master’ in 
English very serviceably helps us to retain and articulate this fundamentally im-
portant difference at the heart of Augustine’s work and the Christianity he played 
such a role in defining. 
Ruden seems concerned throughout to return us to the pristine, purportedly 
more true meaning of terms by hewing to their strictly etymological base and  
the roots on which tendril concepts later flourished. Perhaps then, we too may 
justifiably pause and consider the etymology of an English term like ‘lord’, unlike 
the Latinate ‘master’ — magister, magnus — a word of Germanic derivation. In 
Old English hlāford is a composite of hlāf and weard, ‘loaf’ and ‘ward’, the 
hlāford or original ‘lord’ ‘keeps the provisions’, he is the head of the household, 
like the literal Roman dominus Ruden wishes us to have in mind here. Yet, who 
will argue on the basis of a fairly recondite etymology that we ought therefore  
to use ‘lord’ in English with more exactitude than we ordinarily do and jettison 
centuries of lived tradition, centuries through which the word has gathered, in  
the fascinating way that words do over time, so many accretions of meaning and 
connotation, appropriate for different social contexts, even if all those nuances are 
nourished from the radical sense of ‘authority, power, responsibility, sovereignty, 
honour’ and ultimately ‘head of the house’? 
The kyrios of the Greek New Testament, which the Latin translators of 
scripture rendered dominus, expresses a new kind of relationship, is the summons 
of a new kind of god and calls a new kind of human person into being. Whatever 
original, plain sense — peshat — these terms may have had in the historical durée 
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of everyday usage, they are transformed by the new, revolutionary experience of 
Christianity, its new men like Augustine and its good ‘News’ — euangelium — the 
bold new message, which fulfils and transforms the established and apparently 
literal meanings of the subsequently ‘Old Testament’. The language of Christian 
tradition and of Augustine’s work, itself a pavement of citations, is inherently 
midrashic — searching, interpretative, figurative, discerning the hidden meaning, 
revealing the true relation — and forming a special, characteristic domain or 
register within the larger historical language and tradition. 
If I have dwelt at length on the issue of dominus, Lord and Master, it is 
because in its innovation and defence, it serves as a kind of model example of 
Ruden’s style of argument and the kind of priorities revealed through decisions and 
position. Servus, servire, ‘slave’ and ‘to be a slave or to serve as a slave’ form the 
next, connected item of her glossary. Again, we are told that we have no choice but 
to face the fact of the preciseness of historical usage, which Ruden has redeemed 
for us (p. xxxiii): 
Whatever the looser versions of servitude in Palestine and in the Greek 
world, and the accordingly more nuanced and less harsh constructions 
possible for the relevant vocabulary in Hebrew and Greek, for the Romans, 
a slave was a slave, a piece of property, and any recent marginal legal rights 
slaves had obtained (partly under the influence of Christianity) had 
apparently not disturbed Augustine’s view of a slave’s fate as naturally 
abject (book 7, chapter 8). Augustine considers himself God’s slave; he 
exists at God’s pleasure, he exists only to do god’s will, and only his death 
will deliver him from such an existence. 
And yet Augustine’s relationship with his God, one that Confessions chronicles 
and searches, is thankfully far more interesting than this suggests. His religion is 
not, as I have been arguing, one of submission but of love. Devotion to the body 
and transitory pleasure may indeed make for an abject life — and this is an account 
by a man entering middle age of his earlier, personal struggle to emancipate 
himself from values, philosophical ideas and appetites that he had felt so intensely 
from youth — but this is conceived as a life not a ‘fate’. This life is defined, as the 
work itself seems conceived to express, by growth towards god and by qualities of 
free choosing — Augustine is one of the original articulants of what becomes a 
central issue in later Western philosophising, ‘free will’: liberum arbitrium 
voluntatis — and feeling, by a piety that springs from love, the desire that has 
learnt to desire rightly, the motive that has been transformed into a posture towards 
— ad — the eternal truth.  
The Metaphorik of ownership and enslavement is of limited if not obsolete 
usefulness with this God of Augustine’s, with his Holy Spirit who is paraclete, or 
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comforter, and with a Son of God who came into the world and washed the feet of 
the lowliest of the Earth, himself manifesting a totally new conception of values 
and freedom through service. This is a god, expresses the man who in his youth 
had been ‘in love with love’ (Conf. 3.1), who wants to be elected out of a love 
which is its own reward, being its own pure motive. Augustine’s is a religiosity of 
transformed human relations and transformed spiritual relationships, old meanings 
are renewed or revealed in their true fullness. Origins themselves and the self-
evident, plain sense of things are converted: the New Testament has revealed the 
true meaning of the Old, just so does Augustine’s Confessions present a man 
utterly changed who looks backward and inward and continues to try to make 
sense of himself and divine truth, through studying his inexhaustible self and its 
transformations. Augustine’s life is a transformed meaning, just as the terms of its 
expression are subject to transformation. 
Finding the true meaning of the old in the new truth, quoting the Psalms to 
disclose their fulfilment in the Gospels: this mystical process is at the heart of 
Augustinian interpretation. This typological mode of Augustine’s is an essential 
key to understanding him and his writing, and perhaps we would do well to bring 
to our own interpretation or translation a commensurate sense of meanings as 
standing in complex, recursive relation through time. Tradition and transformation, 
like the facts of a life and its changing meaning over time, form a delicate and 
living dialectic. For translation, one may have thought it goes without saying, is 
interpretation not revelation, it is intrinsically midrashic and its most serious failure 
would consist in any disingenuous claim to be less of a failure than others through 
its privileged proximity or special access to some true, authentic, original meaning 
of the work. 
Ruden wishes to retrieve for us the plain sense of servus and servire, as she 
does with dominus and indeed with Augustine, as I am arguing. A finer historicism 
is meant to return us to their meanings as Augustine would have understood them 
and defend us from the misleadingly ‘more nuanced and less harsh constructions’ 
of Eastern Mediterranean usages and the changing and distinct social world those 
reflect. Even if Augustine baulked as a child at learning Greek and had no Hebrew, 
he was scarcely isolated from a Mediterranean-wide community of letters and 
intellectual exchange. More importantly still, he had lived a life immersed not only 
in early acquaintance with Roman literature and rhetorical education and Greco-
Roman philosophical culture but in intense readings of a Bible, which was itself a 
translation from Hebrew and from Greek into Latin and besides, the bible 
Augustine read, did not constitute a translation from the Hebrew, except if he later 
— reluctantly — may (or not) have used Jerome’s Vulgate. Translation like 
Transformation — conversion — is at the very centre of Christianity, having the 
force of a principle. The complexities of translation, transmission, interpretation 
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and their renewing, conversionary and modificatory effects are everywhere 
relevant in the intricate life and thought of Augustine. 
3.  Hauling in a circle 
One may surmise that the major lines of Ruden’s poetics of translation are as 
follows: she wants to make it new; restore the work to its original vividness; by a 
kind of etymological authority, retrieve the pristine sense of the language; while all 
along making a kind of homage to modernist liberty, such through the 
unconventional lay of type on page (see p. xxxvii ff. on her own ‘compositional 
quirks’, and the ‘white space so useful in modern poetry’ p. xli and for regaining 
the oral cadences of Augustinian reading and delivery); and recovering the primacy 
of the immediate in poetic language, as opposed to the supposedly abstract or 
merely mental, as if the visceral and sensational had more ontic weight or 
authenticity here. Incidentally, this modern poetic alchemist’s quixotic impulse to 
overcome the gap between the concrete, the sensational and the immaterial stuff of 
language and spirit is testified in a poem of her own making, ‘Translators’, with 
which she prefaces this work in her dedication. 
As to the modernist liberties, many will agree that there is no problem in 
introducing anachronistic, non-traditional conventions for specific effect. 
Tradition, after all, is conserving as well as productively innovating. Everyone has 
a position, and there should, naturally, be nothing disqualifying in a reading of 
Augustine as of primarily aesthetic or literary-historical interest, the important 
early prose stylist of Coetzee’s attention. To imply, however, one’s own the 
uniquely right way of looking at him invites scepticism and if the argument is 
offered in a polemical fashion, more than scepticism it may elicit a critical scrutiny 
the polemical translator’s position is not sufficiently developed to withstand. 
We detect guiding principles, but it is not always entirely clear why Ruden 
has made the modifications she has. In that opening passage, for instance, the 
period ‘et laudare te vult homo ... aliqua portio creaturae tuae’ contains the 
repeated phrase aliqua portio creaturae tuae — ‘a little piece of your creation’, 
Chadwick; ‘but a part of your creation’, Hammond; ‘but a tiny part of all that you 
have created’, Sheed; ‘a mere segment of what you have made’, Wills. This phrase, 
epexegetically qualifying the subject homo, finds in the Latin a rhythmic 
alternation with the also repeated clause laudare te vult homo — ‘man wants to 
praise you’. The careful modulation of rhythm in Augustine is lost in Ruden, who 
unaccountably varies the translation of the phrase and loses the repetition — ‘who 
is some part of what you created ... a given portion of your creation’ — upsetting 
its clearly deliberate rhythmic patterning, and it is just so with laudare, which first 
is rendered ‘praise’ then shortly after ‘extol’. 
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The repetition ‘circumferens suam ... circumferens sui’ is not similarly 
marred by what may simply be an attempt at elegant variation or an instance of the 
‘flexibility’ for which Ruden pleads, but her choice of ‘hauling his deathliness in a 
circle, hauling in a circle the evidence of his sin’ — compare “‘bearing his 
mortality with him” (2 Cor. 4:10), carrying with him the witness of his sin’, 
Chadwick; ‘He bears about him his mortality, the evidence of his sinfulness’, 
Sheed; ‘even though humanity bears everywhere its own mortality, and bears 
everywhere the evidence of its own sin’, Hammond; ‘man, “confined by a nature 
that must die”, confined by this evidence of his sin’, Wills — again presents a 
serviceable example of what Ruden may be trying to achieve throughout this work. 
Her phrase is not in itself objectionable, in fact it has undeniable power. Its power 
may be just its problem however, for if it is vividness for the sake of effect it 
comes with a certain cost, rather like the baroque Hellenistic sculpture, which loses 
emotional force even as its artifice for effects of vividness escalates.  
English ‘haul’ connotes a deliberateness and effortfulness about which 
‘carry around’, ‘bear’ and the similarly colourless Latin ‘circumferens’ are neutral. 
‘Haul’ is not simply ‘carry a very heavy burden’ but, surely, ‘consciously be 
straining at pulling along some object’. Sisyphus hauls his rock, Odysseus hauls 
himself onto land, Simon hauls in his heaving nets on Galilee. This does not seem 
to be what humans do with their mortal natures, that is a different kind of burden, 
one that it is possible to be unaware of, that one can, through conversion of one’s 
desires and values, simply release. It is an extraordinary, weightless and fatal 
burden, which one ‘carries with one’ from birth. It is, for Augustine, the 
emancipating burden through which humans can come to yearn for God and the 
delivery from this condition, transience and mortality. 
‘In a circle’ for the ‘circum-’ element of the composite verb is an example 
of the etymological literalism, a maverick’s pedantry even, which hinders rather 
than the opposite, straining too hard to make the reader experience, to really feel, 
the futility which is quite sufficiently expressed by ‘carries around / bears 
everywhere his mortality’. Perhaps most surprising here is ‘deathliness’ for 
mortalitatem. English ‘deathliness’ is not quite the same thing as ‘mortality’. An 
abstract noun formed on the adjective ‘deathly’, ‘deathliness’ is presumably an 
attempt to yield an English equivalent for the Latin formation of mortalitas 
‘mortality’ on mortalis ‘mortal’ from mors ‘death’. ‘Deathliness’ is unusual in 
English, if not downright odd. Why abandon the common ‘mortality’ for its sake? 
One suspects precisely because it is odd and because it is different from all those 
other translations. Originality is, of course, not in itself to be avoided, but neither is 
it in and of itself an absolute good, justifying all else. In an example like this, one 
sees how too much attention is drawn to the wording and choice of the translator in 
her obvious effort to be memorable and vivid and something of Augustine feels 
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lost rather than regained. Like escalation in the nuclear arms race, the proliferation 
of new, more powerful poetic ordinance may lead simply to all round 
neutralization. 
Returning to Ruden’s glossary and specifically the term confessio and the 
English ‘testimony’, the Latin original of which — testimonium — we have seen 
recurring twice in the very carefully worded opening of the work: Ruden would 
prefer to call her translation of Confessions ‘Testimonies’ but is forced to ‘retain 
this title just to keep my translation from being misidentified’ (pp. xxxiii-iv). For 
Ruden ‘confession’ bears too heavily the implication of sin and the later Catholic 
rite of absolution, which it would not have done for Augustine and is thus 
undesirable. Augustine’s work is an auto da fe, ‘testimony’ would express the 
‘strong judicial tinge’ of the public declaration of faith, of which this text is a  
kind (p. xxxiv). It is certainly true that the range of English ‘confession’ is more 
negative and restricted than the Latin confiteor and confessio from which it 
derives. So, what is one to do with a word like confessio and more generally in a 
complex undertaking like this, in which some terms in Latin have a broader range 
than the usual English translation and some in English, by contrast, a broader range 
than the Latin originals? 
When modern Confessions translators insist on the ‘consistency’ and 
‘discipline’ of either translating a Latin single, traditionally 
established English one throughout this long work or footnoting 
exceptions, they are really talking about top-down, academically 
elaborated and enforced ideological and doctrinal consistency and 
discipline, which are much later than Augustine, and the imposition 
of which greatly frustrates his speaking with both perceptible 
religious fervour and authentic rhetorical ingenuity to a very broad 
readership in his time and beyond it. I appeal to professors who may 
be inclined to anathematize my translation because it is different 
from familiar ones: Would not Augustine have wanted flexibility? 
(p. xxvi). 
Ruden pleads for slack. She wants flexibility in her alternating translations (praise 
... extol), and she requires us to accept her versatility as she overcomes what is 
‘only a modern academic, rationalist take on him’. She promises to bring us into 
more direct contact with Augustine: ‘A translator has to get beyond that to his 
inspired synthesis’ (p. xxvii). 
On these traductional ‘headaches Augustine infuses into a translator’ (as 
Ruden peculiarly puts it, p. xxvi) we could profitably compare another translator’s 
approach. In the introduction to the first volume of her own recent translation 
Carolyn Hammond discusses the very problem of confessio (Hammond 2016: Vol. 
1 pp. xviii-xix) and it is in her handling of the defeat to the occasional intractability 
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of translating problems, a kind of intelligent surrender to semantic aporia, that one 
learns a kind of satisfaction in dissatisfaction, a productive surrender: 
As a work, it defies categorization in terms of content; ... Part of the 
answer lies in the carefully chosen title: confessio means a 
declaration, either of belief, praise or sin — and the text is a 
commixture of all three. In his preaching Augustine made this 
explicit to his congregation: (Sermons 67.1). So, nuanced is his 
deployment of the term ... To substitute a variety of terms, such as 
‘declaration of praise’ or ‘affirmation of belief’, would obscure for 
the reader this vital connective thread running through the text. (My 
italics). 
A still more detailed discussion of ‘confession’ and confiteri is to be  
found in Foley’s notes to the 2nd edition of Sheed’s translation (p. 329). This 
(beneficially) difficult Latin word translates the Hebrew psalmist’s hoda(h) and 
Greek exomologeisthai. It includes the three senses registered by Hammond and 
Ruden, but Augustine, while presupposing these different nuances, writes Foley: 
... also expands on the traditional notion of confession by more 
explicitly portraying it as a kind of sacrifice ... This development 
configures confession as a divinely initiated sanctifying 
transformation, and it underscores the relation between confession 
and the entire Christian mystery of death to the old man and rebirth 
in the new. Finally, it implies that Augustine is offering his 
Confessions as a sacrifice to God for the benefit of of the reader, 
specifically, for the purpose of effecting in the reader the same 
transformation. 
At the level of the discrete term as well as the the broader project of the work, we 
find enlargement and transformation. Confessions is in one very real sense a re-
interpretation of confessio. As well as being a complex activation of the Latin 
term’s several denotations, the notion is modified in a thematic fashion by the 
writer whose spiritual transformation is recorded in a transformed language, one 
objective of which is also to transform others. 
Ruden’s wariness about the Catholic sacramental colouring of ‘confession’ 
and its emotional overtones of guilt is quite justified. But her handling of the 
difficulty is not made into an especially helpful opportunity for exploring the 
problem, as it is with other translators. Certainly, we have learned a lot more from 
Foley and Hammond than Ruden’s unhappy resignation to convention and 
frustrated desire to replace confessio with ‘testimony’ ever let on could be the case. 
It is almost with Ruden as if there is in the name of a spurious historicity, some 
need to expurgate the sediments of Church and Catholic history that have 
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accumulated over centuries, to deliver a humanist Augustine who ‘can play 
dramatically with still clear physical meanings’ (p. xxxiv) — a joyful player of 
semiotic games. And yet, Foley’s example brings the term to life in a vital way. 
Confessio apparently forms part of a rich ecosystem of ideas and religious 
emotions and that is its Sitz im Leben, its context is not simply the context of 
historical, domestic or civic usage, it is not inert but activating new meaning, 
having a place in Augustine’s, commemorative, therapeutic and transformative and 
not a lexico-realistic project.  
What had seemed a problem, even a crisis in translation, becomes 
revelatory. It is a revelation of Augustine as extender of meanings, which is 
suppressed by the naïvist reading of Ruden’s translation with its gung-ho 
dispensing of the theologians and scholars (‘flexibility in word choice is an 
absolute necessity for literary faithfulness in translating this author ... I have to 
protest that patristics scholars have in general allowed anachronistic 
misunderstanding of both ancient writing and ancient Christianity to influence their 
dictates on what is proper’ (p. xxv). It would be a shame were this freedom and 
creativity of Augustine’s to be lost on the reader. 
4.  ‘I didn’t love you, and I cheated on you like a true slut’ 
There are many further examples, but they follow the same pattern of 
incommensurabilities between Late Imperial Latin and Modern English, Late 
Antiquity and the early 21st century, Early Christianity and Post Enlightenment. 
We helplessly cover, for instance, Latin caritas, amor, diligentia with the 
overworked ‘love’ in English. In Book 8 Augustine describes the epiphany that 
precipitates his conversion, there appears to him Continentia, which Ruden wishes 
to render ‘Self-control’ again in the interests of an etymological purism, the 
expense of which may be the personficatory force of the name Continentia, to an 
English-speaker’s ear. ‘Abstinence’, incidentally, is out of the question because for 
Americans this apparently is too politically loaded a term (pp. xxxvii-viii). 
Vanus and vanitas are terms ‘pounded by Ecclesiastes’, present in 
translations only because of ‘previous literary history’, according to Ruden. They 
are for her misleadingly translated as ‘vain’ and ‘vanity’ (pp. xxxv-vi), when in 
fact they denote “‘emptiness”, “empty-headedness”, “pretentious”, etc., never 
“vanity” or “vain’”. Hammond, again, succinctly sums up the problem, the usage, 
the Hebrew terms in Ecclesiastes and Job, which the Latin translators chose vanus/ 
vanitas to do the work of and sensibly concludes that ‘No single English word can 
express this range of nuance better than “vanity” itself’ (Hammond 2016: Vol. 1 p. 
xix). In the translator’s scales now the Latin is too semantically weighty, now the 
English outweighs the Latin, now the range of one is much wider, now the other: 
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the languages are not flush. There is not, thank goodness, a perfect correspondence 
between them and we are richer for this generation of referents through the great 
multiplication of diverse signs across different languages. In these cases, ‘previous 
literary history’ is a help, not the mother of illusions to be effaced. That history is 
the record of established compromises, failures perhaps, but ones well illumined by 
scholarship whose consensus opinionis is not testimony to indifference or inertia, 
but optimal adaptation to the problems of an art inherently imperfective. 
A selection of samples from Ruden, whose work we ought perhaps let speak 
more for itself. From early on one begins to get a sense of the latitudes the 
translator allows herself and a feeling that her project is essentially one to give 
Augustine a new tone, (which of course was, we are to understand, his very own 
original tone). Whether the translator’s voice catches the tonality of Augustine or 
not, the following passage certainly seems to exemplify Ruden’s own distinct 
voice, Conf. 1.15: 
Is anyone’s courage so great, because it clings to you with mammoth 
devotion [praegrandi affectu tibi cohaerens]; is there anyone, I ask — and 
come to think of it, a certain kind of cement-headedness [quaedam etiam 
stoliditas] could achieve this, so in fact there is someone — who in clinging 
to you reverently is so enormously devoted that he can pooh-pooh [ita parvi 
aestimet], in this grown-up manner, racks and hooks and similar devices for 
torture, panicked pleas to escape which rise to you from all over the earth? 
In Book 1 Augustine is speaking of his youthful love of Roman Poetry and his 
ensnarement in erotic love, these in fact represent dereliction of God’s true love, 
Conf. 1.21: 
non te amabam, et fornicabar abs te, et fornicanti sonabat undique: ‘euge! 
euge!’ amicitia enim mundi huius fornicatio est abs te ... 
I didn’t love you, and I cheated on you like a true slut, and as I cheated 
there rang around me the words ‘Excellent, excellent!’ A ‘loving’ 
attachment to this world is cheating on you ... [Ruden] 
I [not Aeneas] was the abandoner, the faithless lover, and my faithlessness 
earned the world’s Bravo! Bravo! — since love of the world is 
abandonment of you, ... [Wills] 
I did not love you, and by separating myself from you I prostituted myself; 
and as I prostituted myself the cry resounded from every side: ‘Well done, 
well done!’ For the love of this world is a physical infidelity to you, ... 
[Hammond] 
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I did not love You and I went away from You in fornication: and all around 
me in my fornication echoed applauding cries, well done! Well done! For 
the friendship of this world is fornication against Thee: ... [Sheed] 
I had no love for you and ‘committed fornication against you’ (Ps. 72: 27); 
and in my fornications I heard all around me the cries ‘Well done, well 
done’ (Ps. 34: 21; 39: 16). ‘For the friendship of this world is fornication 
against you’ (Jas. 4:4) ... [Chadwick] 
With Ruden’s ‘like a true slut’ and the thrice repeated ‘cheated on you’, we are in 
the familiar world of contemporary American human relationships, but are we still 
with Augustine in the world of such familiarised emotions, is there really such a 
correspondence; are the right things estranged in this translation and the rights one 
familiarised? We have lost the sense of philosophical and spiritual dimensions of 
relationship, developed through the invocation of Psalms and of the Epistle of 
James [‘... know ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity with God? 
Whosoever therefore will be a friend of the world is the enemy of God.’ Jas. 4.4. 
That itself in turn invokes the traditional Hellenic moral attitude of friends’ 
enemies as my enemies, friends’ friends my own friends]. This is not simply a self-
dramatizing accusation of self as ‘cheater’, but forms part of a richly textured and 
highly developed conception of self, God and relation. It takes the comprehensibly 
human pattern and articulates something higher. 
5.  ‘Jagged and convoluted’: On style 
Ruden has very definite opinions about Augustine’s style and how the English 
translator should handle it (pp. xxii-iii): 
His style ... is quite jagged and convoluted — but thematically so, and not in 
a way a translator should try to mitigate. She should instead hear the author 
saying, as he always does or more less explicitly, ‘I am not the guide for 
your minds; I am not the proper object of praise or admiration. I write in 
this impressive way (as I was trained to do since early boyhood), but 
everything from my personal memories to my cosmic reflections is really 
just a joke — so I fill it with little jokes and keep explicitly backing off it to 
return to prayer and praise of God, where I started.’ ... An objective, 
scientific tone is seldom warranted here. 
Augustine is ventriloquised and, on this basis, we must dispense with ‘scientific 
tone’. Here again is Augustine as blithe, literary joker whose objective is not 
articulating spiritual truth and whose interest for Ruden (and for her projected 
reader) is ‘literary’: ‘But as his translator, I am more interested in Augustine as a 
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literary figure than as a reporter ...’ (p. xvii). The tone of the translator in her 
introduction prepares us remarkably well for the tone of the Augustine of the 
following translation. The pagan literature on which Augustine grew up was 
‘flashy’: ‘The brilliance, flashiness and subtlety of pagan literature’ p. xvii, 
‘cosmopolitan flashiness’ (p. xx). Augustine’s account of his earlier life is racy in 
comparison with the exegetical and philosophical reflections of Books 10-13, 
forming a ‘sexier life narrative’ (p. xix).  
Augustine speaks, perhaps scandalously for the squeamish or the idealising, 
of nocturnal emissions and politically incorrectly refers to women as ‘little 
women’, (p. xxxix). Translators have glossed over his plain meaning, wishing he 
were not so frank but here is Ruden to repair these omissions. 
As a partly folksy, sometimes smirking writer — or just as a man of his 
time — Augustine sometimes commits himself where his translators have 
wished he wouldn’t, and this has led them to gloss over what he does 
plainly express (p. xxxix). 
To many it will come as a great surprise to find Augustine characterised in this 
manner. At any rate, ‘partly folksy, sometimes smirking, or just a man of his time’ 
would make a pretty accurate blurb for this translation. 
The account in Book 8 of Augustine’s epiphany and conversion in the 
garden at Ostia is a high point of the work and of the whole canon. The taste for 
sound effects and a certain characteristic awkwardness (it is deliberately meant to 
convey the so-called ‘jaggedness’ of Augustine’s Latin, we may surmise) but the 
momentum of the writing, towards the climax of the scene — a dramatic impetus 
which may be the main point — is diminished in Ruden’s rendering, for example, 
Conf. 8.25: 
So, I was sick and suffering horrendously, accusing myself more fiercely 
(or excessively more fiercely) than usual [solito acerbius nimis] and turning 
and churning in my chain [volvens et versans me in vinculo meo] until the 
last trace of it still holding me could be entirely torn off; but for me it held 
me nevertheless [donec abrumperetur totum, quo iam exiguo tenebar, sed 
tenebar tamen]. And within my secret self you stood over me, Master, [et 
instabas tu in occultis meis, domine] with your cruel mercy, stepping up the 
lashing [flagella ingeminans] of terror and shame, so that I wouldn’t stop 
trying. If I did stop, that single tiny, wispy chain that remained [idipsum 
exiguum et tenue quod remanserat] wouldn’t be broken; instead, its 
soundness would be renewed [revalesceret iterum], and it would bind me 
more sturdily. 
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The translator’s indecision at ‘more fiercely (or excessively more fiercely)’ 
is sloppy, an editorial oversight at best; the parenthesised alternative ‘excessively 
more fiercely’ will test the forbearance of even the most permissive reader of 
English. The Latin solito acerbius nimis could quite simply be translated as ‘very 
much more fiercely’. ‘Turning and churning in my chain’ does mimic the 
alliteration of Augustine, although to some that may not be sufficient to excuse  
the tin-eared effect of this phrasing. ‘[B]ut for me it held me nevertheless’ for 
tenebar ‘I was held’ is awkward. More significantly still, the delicate interplay in 
Augustine’s account of activity and passivity and of a kind of reflexive middle 
state, of coming voluntarily to God and being driven on by a mix of feelings, of 
yearning and resistance expressed in the mix of passive and active verbs can be 
easily lost here in a translation not equal to the subtlety of momentum in 
Augustine’s prose, which expresses so powerfully the gradual, tentative and pained 
flowering of the soul opening in conversion.  
This is self-manumission from sin. Sin is of itself its own ‘lashing’, flagella, 
and consciousness of it is ‘redoubled’ pain, ingeminans. ‘Thin and fine’ — 
exiguum et tenue — essentially hendiadys, becomes ‘single tiny, wispy chain’ in 
Ruden. It continues: 
I was saying to myself inwardly, ‘Okay, right now, I’m letting it happen, 
right now I’m letting it happen’ [dicebam enim apud me intus, ‘ecce modo 
fiat, modo fiat,’]. Even as I spoke I was already starting to enter into the 
resolve. I was already — almost acting, and yet I wasn’t acting [iam paene 
faciebam et non faciebam] ... 
He is almost beginning to do it, to make the step: the sense over these passages is 
of the deep seriousness, the astonishing and utterly plausible commingling of 
agonizing and yearning longing. Augustine is a man of hesitations and deep 
thoughtfulness; his writing is the very instance of this nature. Further on we follow 
this so very delicately chronicled process: 
I was hanging back from dying to death and living for life [haesitans mori 
morti et vitae vivere]. For me what was worse was stronger, because it was 
deeply inculcated, than what was better, because I wasn’t habituated to the 
latter [plusque in me valebat deterius inolitum quam melius insolitum].  
The nearer to me that moment moved at which I was to become something 
different, the more it struck terror into my heart. But it didn’t strike me back 
or turn me to the side; it just left me dangling there [sed non recutiebat retro 
nec avertebat, sed suspendebat]. 
Ruden’s salient ‘living for life’ for vitae vivere in this famous passage, bears the 
unfortunate colouring of the contemporary self-help maxim. Contrast it with 
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Watts’ ‘to die unto death, and live unto life’ (also Sheed); or Hammond’s ‘dying to 
death and living to life’ (also Chadwick).  
Since Ruden is primarily interested in Augustine as ‘literary artist’, it is 
surprising how she will pass over in silence his playing with words. At the opening 
of Book 3 he puns on Carthago, ‘Carthage’/ Sartago, ‘cooking pan’. It is probably 
impossible to express this pun identically in English. Hammond makes Carthage a 
seething ‘melting pot of illicit passions’, Sheed gives the witchy ‘a cauldron of 
illicit loves boiled about me’, and explains the pun in a note. Where Hammond 
evokes the promiscuity of farrago and Sheed the spiritual deviance of dark magic, 
Ruden seems above all to value the immediacy of the domestic detail and the 
opportunity for sibilant alliteration: ‘I came to Carthage, to the center of a skillet 
where outrageous love affairs hissed all around me’. Similarly, in the passage 
above, in the well balanced deterius inolitum quam melius insolitum, there is 
paronomasia of which we have no hint in Ruden’s choppy English: ‘For me what 
was worse was stronger, because it was deeply inculcated, than what was better, 
because I wasn’t habituated to the latter’. Inolitum is something like ‘ingrown’ and 
insolitum ‘unaccustomed’. To be fair, she could not be expected to signal every 
nuance of the Latin, but any ‘jaggedness’ here is with her and not in fact in 
Augustine. Compare Sheed’s ‘The lower condition which had grown habitual was 
more powerful than the better condition which I had not tried’, although 
necessarily more extended than the marvellously compact Latin, this preserves 
some of the rhythmic feel of Augustine’s elegant phrasing. 
With Ruden we are promised the authentic, fun Augustine, a joking 
Augustine with a sexy backstory (even if he does lapse into high abstraction and 
biblical exegesis after the ninth book) and an habitual smirk, not a ‘plodder or 
systematizer’ but a ‘poetic, organically branching, rather whimsical author’. Other 
translators have given us a far more nuanced, more interesting Augustine, one 
marked by much more creatively exciting tensions than Ruden’s sub-Nabokovian, 
literary joker. 
6.  In aenigmate: Dark figures 
Augustine is strange to himself, an enigma which he sees, as into a glass darkly. 
How then will we, also mysterious to ourselves, ever have the last word on what he 
meant? In the chapter on Confessions in his acclaimed life of Augustine, Peter 
Brown discusses Augustine on his own opaqueness to himself, the problem 
presented of being made up of a seemingly limitless inner landscape, much of 
which was dark to his own surveying conscience.7 There is for Augustine, 
                                                   
7  Brown 2000 [1967]:172-3. 
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especially in comparison with the Neo-Platonist Plotinus’ luminous imagining of 
the mind, a ‘murmurous region’ a darkness adumbrating the bright consciousness, 
which too for the African constitutes himself, Conf. 10.16.25 (here in Brown’s own 
translation of quoted passages in his Augustine of Hippo — A biography): 
This memory of mine is a great force, a vertiginous mystery, my God, a 
hidden depth of infinite complexity: and this is my soul. And this is what I 
am. What, then, am I, my God? What is my true nature? A living thing, 
taking innumerable forms, quite limitless ...  
For there is in me a lamentable darkness in which my latent possibilities are 
hidden from myself, so that my mind, questioning itself upon its own 
powers, feels that it cannot rightly trust its own report (Conf. 10.12.48). 
Here is the true modernity and originality of Augustine, one may feel, far more so 
than in some putative sense of his free play of signs or as cosmopolitan 
manipulator of language as an elaborate, ‘literary’ joke who simply marshals a 
‘flashy’ education in rhetoric in service of a new master. Long before Freud, 1200 
years before Shakespeare, this complex, extraordinarily sensitive, Romanised 
African thinker marvelled how ‘there is in man an area which not even the spirit of 
man knows of’ (Conf. 10.5. 7).  
The critic Frank Kermode once published a short and brilliant essay in a 
volume of the same title, called ‘The Uses of Error’. The history of reading the 
Bible and translating it is in one real sense a history of productive misprision, he 
argues. He demonstrates this with the case in Saint Jerome’s Vulgate of a 
mistranslation from the Hebrew of ‘curse’/ ‘bless’ in the Book of Job and traces the 
ramification of the error, which becomes in English the established and famous 
utterance of Job’s wife ‘Curse God and die’. As Kermode wrote: 
The history of interpretation, the skills by which we keep alive in our minds 
the light and dark of past literature and past humanity, is to an incalculable 
extent a history of error. Or perhaps it would be better to say, of ambiguity, 
of antithetical senses ... We have always been pretty sure that the literal 
sense is not enough, and when we try to go beyond it we may err, but 
sometimes splendidly.8 
As with self so with scripture and its translation: there is always a certain measure 
of ignorance, misunderstanding and error. Out of ambiguity and even out of 
antithetical senses, not simply dogmatic cleaving to what we may claim to be the 
authentic literal sense, we may chance upon new light. Through the cracks of sin 
                                                   
8  Kermode 1991:431. 
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and error we learn that there may issue the splendour, for the secular critic, of 
meaning; or for the Christian studying the significance of their fallenness and 
desire for redemption, of divine Truth. 
The translation and continual re-interpretation of certain kinds of works — 
those works, classics, which endure because, in Kermode’s defining phrase, they 
are ‘patient of interpretation’ — represents a kind of opportunity for error of a 
certain profound kind. Tradition and interpretation in complex dialectic enrich one 
another in a perpetual motion of intelligence and feeling. 
It is part of our experience of the past that we change it as it passes through 
our hands; and in changing it we may make it more puzzling in making it 
more our own.9 
We are changed by what we study and it changes us and even reconstitutes us. This 
is surely a humbling fact to recognise. There is always that in works, as in 
ourselves, to which we have not access, or only in the most oblique ways. 
We bring ourselves and our conflicts to words, to poems and pictures, as we 
bring them to the world; and thus, we change the poems and the pictures, or 
perhaps it is ourselves we change.10 
We require great works and we require great interpretations and gifted interpreters 
in order to live more deeply. The sense of poems and pictures and novels does not 
lie open and plain for all to see, for sense never does, but is always something 
sought.11 
In this seeking, we rely on Augustine and the scholars who following him 
continuously reconstitute his meanings as tradition, just as the faithful rely on their 
praedicantes to illuminate the readings of scripture and their unapparent meanings. 
We ought to feel gratitude for the great fortune to live in this age of scholarship, 
which provides precious consolation for the shallowness and crudeness of a 
deceptively accessible contemporary public discourse, with its platforms and 
sensationally memorable language devised by marketers and purveyors of larger 
than life personality. If we only seek, the fascination and the meanings of history 
are there to rediscover. If we truly will it, we find many ways into great writers are 
opened to us by accomplished and generous scholars.  
Augustine opened his work, as we saw, with searching questions about the 
knowledge of God and the recognising him rightly, that fundamental problem that 
                                                   
9  Kermode 1991:429. 
10  Kermode 1991:432. 
11  See on this topic also Kermode’s essay ‘The plain sense of things’ in An appetite for 
poetry, 1989. 
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besets believing human beings and those who yearn for belief. He closed his 
Confessions, as ever expecting us to recognise the reference to Scripture (Matthew 
7:7-8) and to the opening of his own Books 1 and 12, with three elegantly 
modulated sets of three refrains. O’Donnell in his commentary points out ‘the shift 
from subjunctive [in Books 1 and 12] to the indicative future’ here, ‘marking the 
surety of the promises’ in Hammond’s phrase. Confessions has been a great 
development, expressed in many subtle ways. It is a fine sphragis or seal on this 
great work, which will for more millennia still richly reward the closest study. 
Here is Augustine’s ending with Hammond’s fine English rendering, Conf. 
13.38.53: 
 
et hoc intellegere quis hominum dabit homini?  
Quis angelus angelo?  
Quis angelus homini?  
A te petatur,  
In te quaeratur,  
Ad te pulsetur:  
Sic, sic accipietur,  
Sic invenietur,  
Sic aperietur. 
 
What human being can give another the power to 
Understand this? 
What angel can give it to another angel? 
What angel can give it to a mortal? 
We must ask it of you. 
We must seek it from you. 
We must knock at your door. 
This, this, is how it will be received. 
This is how it will be found. 
This is how it will be opened. 
7.  Conclusion 
Despite the foregoing reservations expressed, it must be said that Ruden’s work 
should be welcomed as a contribution to the study and, perhaps more importantly, 
the popularising of Augustine’s work as quite simply great reading. As readers we 
will naturally cultivate personal tastes and retain different views about translation. 
It is precisely this (ideally) judicious and fair-minded mutual assessment, this 
disputed reception, which serves so well as a means to keep alive and re-articulate 
the vitality of great works from the past.  
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Ruden’s strong, prefatory claims invite special scrutiny from a reviewer. 
Just because one’s attitude, expectations and techniques are those of a scholar 
reader does not mean that one should be disqualified, denied as a mere Casaubon, 
incapable of being with it. Discerning in Augustine a different tone than that a new 
translator does is not necessarily tantamount to an unreadiness to embrace new 
positions or fresh takes. Equally, just because one claims to be innovative and 
maverick, it does not mean that when readers do not find that your arguments 
always stand up to scrutiny or compare well with others, that this is because they 
are conservative and on principle against innovation and new approaches. We must 
always hope for brave, searching, new interpretations and hope to be equal to the 
challenge of revising our vision of the past and of the works we cherish. 
New translations, which is to say new interpretations, ought to be taken very 
seriously and carefully considered in comparison with other, previous translations 
and the original language of the text and not, of course, only on the basis of the 
claims made by the translator. We ought to hope that Ruden’s work will find its 
way not only to established lovers of literature and of Augustine, but to many new 
readers and that through it they will find their own way to an ever richer and more 
rewarding experience of classic works such as Augustine’s Confessions. 
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